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The predictions that quantum theory makes about the outcomes of measurements are generally
probabilistic. This has raised the question whether quantum theory can be considered complete, or
whether there could exist alternative theories that provide improved predictions. Here we review
recent work that considers arbitrary alternative theories, constrained only by the requirement that
they are compatible with a notion of “free choice” (defined with respect to a natural causal order).
It is shown that quantum theory is “maximally informative”, i.e., there is no other compatible
theory that gives improved predictions. Furthermore, any alternative maximally informative theory
is necessarily equivalent to quantum theory. This means that the state a system has in such a
theory is in one-to-one correspondence with its quantum-mechanical state (the wave function). In
this sense, quantum theory is complete.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we look at the question of whether quan-
tum theory is optimal in terms of the predictions it makes
about measurement outcomes, or whether, instead, there
could exist an alternative theory with improved predic-
tive power. This was much debated in the early days
of quantum theory, when many eminent physicists sup-
ported the view that quantum theory will eventually be
replaced by a deeper underlying theory. Our aim will be
to show that no alternative theory can extend the pre-
dictive power of quantum theory, and hence that, in this
sense, quantum theory is complete.
Before turning to this question, it is worth reflecting
on why one might think that quantum theory may not
be optimally predictive. A key factor is that the the-
ory is probabilistic. This is in stark contrast with classi-
cal theory, which is deterministic at a fundamental level.
Even in classical theory there are scenarios where we may
assign probabilities to various events, for example when
making a weather forecast. However, this isn’t in conflict
with our belief in underlying determinism, but, instead,
the fact that we assign probabilities simply reflects a lack
of knowledge (about the precise value of certain physical
quantities) when making the prediction. By analogy, we
might imagine that even if we know the quantum state
of a system before measurement (i.e., its wave function),
we are also in a position of incomplete knowledge, and
that additional knowledge might be provided in a higher
theory.
A further argument for incompleteness was given by
Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) [1]. They argued
that whenever the outcome of an experiment can be pre-
dicted with certainty, there should be a counterpart in
the theory representing its value. They then consider
measurements on a maximally entangled pair. In this
scenario, the outcome of any measurement on one mem-
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ber of the pair can be perfectly predicted given access to
the other member. Since the particles can be far apart,
a measurement on one shouldn’t, say EPR, affect the
other in any way. They hence argue that there should
be parts of the theory allowing these perfect predictions
and, hence, that the quantum description is incomplete.
Following EPR, one might hope that quantum theory
can be explained in terms of an underlying determin-
istic theory. Such a view was put into doubt by the
Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem, independently discovered
by Kochen and Specker [2] and by Bell [3], who showed
that an underlying deterministic theory is not possible
if one demands non-contextuality and freedom of choice.
(A non-contextual theory is one in which the probability
of a particular measurement outcome occurring depends
only on the projector associated with that outcome, and
not on the entire set of projectors that specify the mea-
surement according to quantum theory.) Furthermore
it was also shown by Bell [4] that there cannot be an
underlying theory that is compatible with local causal-
ity (we will explain this in more detail in Section V).
It is also worth noting that an assumption about local-
ity can be seen as a physical means of justifying certain
non-contextuality conditions.
In this paper, we consider arbitrary alternative the-
ories and ask whether they could have more predictive
power than quantum theory. We remark that this ques-
tion is different from those asked by Kochen and Specker
and by Bell, whose goal was to rule out theories with cer-
tain specific properties such as non-contextuality or local
causality. In this work, we do not demand any of these
properties. The only assumption we make about a theory
is that it is compatible with a notion of free choice (de-
fined with respect to a natural causal order—see later).
Roughly, the freedom of choice assumption demands that
the theory can be applied to a setting where an exper-
imenter makes certain choices independently of certain
pre-existing parameters. It is worth noting that quan-
tum theory is compatible with this assumption, as we
would expect, since it is a reasonable theory. We also
remark that such an assumption is necessary for Kochen
and Specker’s as well as for Bell’s arguments.
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2As a toy example of an alternative theory that enables
improved predictions over those of quantum theory, but
which may still be probabilistic, one might imagine that
the quantum state is supplemented by an additional pa-
rameter Z. When measuring one half of a maximally
entangled pair of qubits, it could be that if Z = 0 the
extended theory assigns outcome 0 with probability 3/4,
and outcome 1 with probability 1/4, while, if Z = 1,
the extended theory assigns outcome 0 with probability
1/4, and outcome 1 with probability 3/4. The extended
theory would thus provide more information than quan-
tum theory, which predicts that both outcomes occur
with probability 1/2. Furthermore, if Z is uniformly dis-
tributed, the quantum predictions are recovered when Z
is unknown (and hence the extended theory is compatible
with quantum theory).
This particular example is rather artificial and its pur-
pose is merely to illustrate that—in principle—a theory
that is more informative than quantum theory is con-
ceivable. However, there are historical precedents of this
type, for instance related to the problem of determining
the mass of chemical elements. Take, as an example, the
atomic mass of chlorine. Before the discovery of isotopes,
its atomic mass was thought to be 35.5, and the standard
measurement techniques of the time confirmed it as such.
However, it was later discovered that chlorine in fact nat-
urally occurs as two isotopes with atomic masses 35 and
37 (in approximate ratio 3 : 1). By introducing isotopes,
the theory was extended in such a way that the mass of an
individual atom could be better predicted. Note that the
predictions made before the discovery of isotopes were
not incorrect, but are simply the natural ones to make
without knowledge of the different isotopes (and hence
the new theory is compatible with the old one).
Returning to quantum theory, various alternatives,
motivated more physically than our earlier toy example,
have been proposed in the past, some of which we will re-
view later (see Section V). Similarly to quantum theory,
these alternatives provide rules to compute predictions
for future measurement outcomes, based on certain (ad-
ditional) parameters.
The aim of this paper is to explain recent results re-
lating the predictive power of quantum theory to that of
possible alternative theories [5, 6]. For this, we first need
to specify what we mean by “quantum theory” and by
“alternative theories”, and how they can be compared
(Section III). The central requirement we impose on any
alternative theory is that it be compatible with a no-
tion of “free choice”. This means that the theory can
be applied consistently in scenarios where measurements
are chosen independently of certain other events (Sec-
tion IV). We then discuss the implications of some ex-
isting results to our main question. These impose con-
straints on any alternative theory that is compatible with
quantum theory; for instance, no such theory can be
locally deterministic (Section V). The last sections are
then devoted to the recent, more general, results. A cen-
tral claim is that no alternative theory that is compati-
ble with quantum theory can improve the predictions of
quantum theory (Sections VI and VII). Furthermore, if
such an alternative theory is also at least as informative
as quantum theory, then it is necessarily equivalent to
quantum theory (Section VIII). In this sense, quantum
theory is complete. We conclude with a discussion of how
these results relate to known hidden-variable theories, in
particular the de Broglie-Bohm theory, and mention some
applications (Section IX).
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
On a technical level, the main results presented in this
paper are theorems about random variables (RVs) whose
(joint) probability distribution satisfies certain assump-
tions. We will only use RVs with discrete range. In the
following we introduce our notation for such RVs and
their distributions.
We usually use upper case letters to denote RVs, while
lower case letters specify particular values they can take.
Thus, X = x means that the RV X takes the value x.
We write PX to denote the probability distribution of
the RV X, with PX(x) being the probability that X =
x. For two RVs, X and Y , PXY represents their joint
distribution. We also use PX|Y := PXY /PY to represent
the conditional distribution of X given Y . This is defined
for all y such that PY (y) > 0. For any such y, we write
PX|Y=y := PX|Y (·, y) to denote the distribution of the
RV X conditioned on Y = y. We often abbreviate this
distribution to PX|y. We also use P (X = Y ) to denote
the probability that the RVs X and Y have equal values,
i.e. P (X = Y ) :=
∑
x PXY (x, x) and, likewise, P (X 6=
Y ) := 1− P (X = Y ).
B. Distance between probability distributions
Our technical argument uses the variational distance
to quantify the closeness of two probability distributions.
For two distributions, PX and QX , it is defined by
D(PX , QX) :=
1
2
∑
x
|PX(x)−QX(x)| .
This measure is connected to the distinguishability of the
two distributions. Specifically, suppose we have a black
box that samples either from PX or QX . Then, given one
sample, the maximum probability of successfully guess-
ing whether the sample has been generated from PX or
QX equals
1
2 (1 +D(PX , QX)). Thus, if two distributions
are close in variational distance, they are virtually indis-
tinguishable. Appendix A summarizes some properties
of D(·, ·) that are used in this work.
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FIG. 1: Illustration of the terms in the correlation measure
IN . This measure is defined as the sum of the probabilities of
obtaining opposite outcomes when measuring two subsystems in
neighbouring bases (depicted with the solid lines), and of obtain-
ing the same outcomes for a = 0, b = 2N − 1 (depicted with
the dashed line).
C. Measuring correlations
A useful approach towards characterizing alternative
theories is to consider the correlations (between the out-
comes of two distant measurements) that can be repro-
duced by a given theory. The strength of these correla-
tions may then, for instance, be compared to those oc-
curring in quantum theory. To quantify correlations, we
use a measure that has been proposed by Pearle [7] and,
independently, by Braunstein and Caves [8], based on
earlier work by Clauser, Horne, Shimony, and Holt [9].
The correlation measure is tailored to a specific bipar-
tite setup where measurements are carried out at two
separate locations. One of the measurements is speci-
fied by a parameter A and has outcome X. The other
is specified by a parameter B and has outcome Y . It is
furthermore assumed that the outcomes X and Y take
values from the binary set {0, 1} and that the param-
eters A and B are labelled by elements from the sets
{0, 2, . . . , 2N − 2} =: AN and {1, 3, . . . , 2N − 1} =: BN ,
respectively, where N is an integer. The correlation mea-
sure, in the following denoted by IN , is then defined by
IN (PXY |AB) := P (X = Y |A = 0, B = 2N − 1) +∑
a∈AN, b∈BN
|a−b|=1
P (X 6= Y |A = a,B = b) ,
and depicted in Figure 1. Note that the measure only de-
pends on the conditional distribution PXY |AB , and that
stronger correlations have a lower value of IN .
We will be particularly interested in the correlations
that quantum theory predicts for measurements on two
maximally entangled two-level systems. To specify these
correlations, define
|ψ2〉 := 1√
2
(|↑↑〉+ |↓↓〉) ,
where {|↑〉 , |↓〉} is an orthonormal basis. Furthermore,
let |θ〉 = cos θ2 |↑〉+ sin θ2 |↓〉, and take Eax to be the pro-
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FIG. 2: Depiction of the measurements used to achieve the
quantum value of the correlation measure IN . The circle
represents the {|↑〉 , 1√
2
(|↑〉 + |↓〉)} plane of the Bloch sphere.
The arrows depict the Bloch vectors associated with the 0 out-
come (i.e. Ea0 or F
b
0 are the projectors onto these states). Those
for the 1 outcome lie in the opposite direction and are not de-
picted. In the limit of large N , the measurements for neighbour-
ing bases (|a − b| = 1) are virtually identical and the outcomes
are almost always perfectly correlated. Conversely, for a = 0,
b = 2N − 1 and large N , the measurements are virtually oppo-
site of one another and the outcomes are almost always perfectly
anti-correlated.
jector onto
∣∣( a2N + x)pi〉 and, likewise, F by to be the pro-
jector onto
∣∣( b2N + y)pi〉, as shown in Figure 2. We then
define PNXY |ABψ2 as the conditional distribution of the
outcomes of two separate quantum measurements, spec-
ified by {Eax}x and {F by}y, respectively, applied to two
separate subsystems with joint state |ψ2〉, i.e.,
PNXY |abψ2(x, y) := 〈ψ2|Eax ⊗ F by |ψ2〉 .
It is easy to verify that the correlation strength, quanti-
fied with the above correlation measure, IN , equals
IN (P
N
XY |ABψ2) = 2N sin
2 pi
4N
≤ pi
2
8N
. (1)
III. QUANTUM AND ALTERNATIVE
THEORIES
The aim of this paper is to make statements about
physical theories, i.e., quantum theory as well as possi-
ble alternatives to it. However, in order to derive our
result, we do not need to provide a comprehensive math-
ematical definition for the concept of a “physical theory”.
Rather, it suffices to focus on one crucial feature that we
expect any theory to have, namely that it allows us to
compute predictions about values that can be observed
(e.g., in an experiment). These predictions, which need
not be deterministic, are generally based on certain pa-
rameters that characterize the (experimental) setup, i.e.,
4how it has been prepared (its initial state), the evolution
it undergoes, and which measurements are going to be
applied.
A. Predictions of quantum theory
In quantum theory, given the state, Ψ, of a system as
well as a specification of the measurement process, A, a
prediction about an experimentally observable value, X,
can be obtained from Born’s rule. The state Ψ may be
given in the form of a density operator on a Hilbert space
H and any measurement process A = a can be charac-
terized by a Positive Operator Valued Measure (POVM)
on H, i.e., a family of positive operators {Eax}x labelled
by the possible measurement outcomes x ∈ X such that∑
xE
a
x = 1H. (In this work, we assume for simplicity
that the set X is finite.)
For our treatment, we will assume that any evolution
of the system prior to the measurement {Eax}x is already
accounted for by its quantum state, i.e, that Ψ = ψ is
the state of the system directly before the measurement
is applied.1 The predictions that quantum theory makes
about the measurement outcome X can then be repre-
sented as a conditional distribution PX|AΨ, which is given
by
PX|aψ(x) = tr(Eaxψ) ∀ x ∈ X . (2)
We note that, by considering an extension of the Hilbert
space H, we may describe any quantum-mechanical mea-
surement process equivalently as a projective measure-
ment, i.e., one for which the POVM {Eax}x consists of
orthogonal projectors.2 Furthermore, we call a set of
POVMs {Eax} on H tomographically complete if the val-
ues PX|aψ(x) for all a and x are sufficient to determine
ψ on H uniquely.3
For later reference, we also note that, according to
quantum theory, any possible evolution of a quantum
system, S, corresponds to a unitary mapping on a larger
state space (that may include the environment of the sys-
tem). In the case of a measurement process, this larger
state space includes the measurement device, D. Specif-
ically, a projective measurement, say {Eax}x, would cor-
respond to a unitary of the form
|ψ〉 7→
∑
x
√
Eax |ψ〉S ⊗ |x〉D ,
1 Alternatively, one may work in the Heisenberg picture, for in-
stance, and use the POVM to account for the evolution.
2 According to Naimark’s theorem, there exists a Hilbert space H¯
that contains H as a subspace as well as orthogonal projectors
Pax in H¯ such that for each x ∈ X the POVM element Eax is the
projection of Pax into H.
3 An example of a tomographically complete set of projective
POVMs in the case of a single qubit are the three POVMs whose
elements are projectors onto (i) |↑〉 and |↓〉, (ii) (|↑〉 + |↓〉)/√2
and (|↑〉− |↓〉)/√2, and (iii) (|↑〉+ i |↓〉)/√2 and (|↑〉− i |↓〉)/√2.
where {|x〉D} are orthonormal states of the measurement
device (and possibly also its environment) that encode
the outcome. The outcome X of the original measure-
ment may then be recovered by a subsequent projective
measurement on D in the basis {|x〉D}.
B. Predictions of alternative theories
In an alternative theory, the measurement process A
with outcome X, as described above in terms of the quan-
tum formalism, may admit a different description. This
description could involve other parameters, which we de-
note by Z (one might think of Z as the list of all param-
eters used by the theory to describe the system’s state
before the measurement A is chosen).4 For any values
A = a and Z = z of these parameters, the theory spec-
ifies a rule for computing the probability distribution,
PX|az, for the measurement outcome X. Hence, in the
following, if we want to make a statement about the pre-
dictive power of a given theory,5 it is sufficient to consider
the properties of the corresponding distributions PX|az.
Since we want to use theories to make predictions,
we usually think of Z as (in principle) learnable. How-
ever, this is merely an interpretive statement, and none
of the conclusions of this work are affected if Z is instead
thought of as forever hidden and hence unlearnable in
principle. The only thing that changes in the latter case
is the interpretation of other statements. In particular,
one may not want to call the condition PXZ|AB = PXZ|A,
derived in Section VII A, a “no-signalling” condition, or
to speak about “predictions” made based on Z if Z is
not learnable in principle.
C. Compatibility of predictions
The predictions computed within two different theo-
ries (e.g., quantum theory and an alternative theory) are
generally not identical. Nevertheless, they may be com-
patible with each other, in the following sense. Let Z
and Z ′ be the parameters of two different theories, and
let their predictions (about the outcome X of a measure-
ment A) be given by conditional probability distributions
PX|AZ and PX|AZ′ , respectively.6
Definition 1. PX|AZ and PX|AZ′ are said to be com-
patible if there exists a conditional distribution P¯XZZ′|A
4 In [5], Z was modelled more generally as a system with input and
output. For simplicity, we ignore this higher level of generality
in this work.
5 When referring to the predictive power of a theory, we mean
predictions based on the value Z.
6 Note that the conditional probability distribution PX|AZ (and,
similarly, PX|AZ′ ) may be defined only for a restricted set of
pairs (a, z).
5such that7
PX|az =
∑
z′
P¯XZ′|az(·, z′) ∀ a, z
PX|az′ =
∑
z
P¯XZ|az′(·, z) ∀ a, z′,
where the conditional distributions in the sums are de-
rived from P¯XZZ′|a.8
To relate the definition back to the earlier example of
the isotopes, by way of illustration, the chemical element
could be specified by Z, and the particular isotope by
Z ′. The relevant predictions are then compatible in the
above sense: since Z ′ is a fine-graining of Z (i.e., Z is
uniquely determined by Z ′), the second relation is trivial,
while the first recovers the non-isotopic predictions by
averaging over the different isotopes.
We will use this notion of compatibility to compare
quantum theory to alternative theories. For this, we let
Z ′ ≡ Ψ be the quantum state of a system and consider
the conditional distribution PX|AΨ defined by (2). An
alternative theory with predictions specified by PX|AZ
(based on a parameter Z) can then be considered com-
patible with quantum theory if there exists a distribution
P¯XZΨ|A such that both PX|AΨ and PX|AZ can be recov-
ered from it (in the sense of the above definition).
D. Comparing the accuracy of predictions
The predictive powers of different theories can be com-
pared provided the theories are mutually compatible.
The idea is that a theory with predictions PX|AZ is at
least as informative as another theory with predictions
PX|AZ′ if the latter can be obtained from the former, i.e.,
if the parameter Z ′ does not provide any information be-
yond Z. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 2. Let PX|AZ and PX|AZ′ be compatible.
PX|AZ is said to be (at least) as informative as PX|AZ′
if there exists a conditional distribution P¯XZZ′|A as in
Definition 1 such that
PX|az = P¯X|azz′ ∀ a, z, z′ s.t. P¯ZZ′|a(z, z′) > 0 ,
where P¯X|azz′ and P¯ZZ′|a are the conditional distribu-
tions derived from P¯XZZ′|A.
7 We require that both sides of the equalities are defined for the
same pairs (a, z) and (a, z′).
8 That is, P¯XZ′|az is given by
P¯XZ′|az(x, z′) = P¯XZZ′|a(x, z, z′)/P¯Z|a(z) (if P¯Z|a(z) > 0)
where P¯Z|a(z) =
∑
x,z′ P¯XZZ′|a(x, z, z
′), and likewise for
P¯XZ|az′ .
This can again be illustrated using the earlier example
of the isotopes. The theory that includes the information
Z ′ about the particular isotope is of course at least as
informative as the one that only specifies the chemical
element Z, but Z is not as informative as Z ′.
We remark that quantum-mechanical predictions
based on pure states are generally more informative than
those derived from mixed states. To see this, imagine a
system that is prepared in a pure state ψC depending on
a random bit C, and assume that a measurement with
outcome X is performed. If C is unknown, with C = 0
and C = 1 being equally likely, the distribution of X is,
according to quantum theory, given by (2) with ψ sub-
stituted by the mixed state 12ψ0 +
1
2ψ1. However, if we
had access to C, we could use (2) with ψ replaced by ψC ,
resulting in a more accurate prediction.
Clearly, when studying the question of whether there
can be more informative theories than quantum theory,
we need to consider specifications of states and measure-
ment processes that are maximally informative among
all predictions that are possible within quantum theory.
Hence, following the above remark, we will restrict our
attention to quantum states that correspond to pure den-
sity operators and to projective measurements.
IV. FREEDOM OF CHOICE
As explained above, physical theories involve certain
parameters, and it is generally assumed (often implicitly)
that these can be chosen freely. Quantum mechanics, for
instance, allows us to compute the probabilities of a mea-
surement outcome X depending on the system’s state Ψ
as well as a description of the measurement process, A,
and our understanding is that these parameters can in
principle be chosen freely (e.g., by an experimenter car-
rying out a measurement of her choice). In fact, one
may argue that a description of nature that does not in-
volve any such choices—thereby not allowing us to com-
pute conclusions for different initial conditions—cannot
be reasonably termed a theory [10].
It is worth noting that by assuming free choice, we
are not making any metaphysical assertion that the real
world contains, say, agents with free will, or anything
of that sort. Instead, allowing free choice is a property
that we require of a theory. In essence, it means that the
theory gives predictions for all possible values of the free
parameters, and furthermore, that it does so no matter
what happened elsewhere in the theory. Without such
an assumption, depending on other events described by
the theory, certain values of the ‘free’ parameters could
be unavailable, in the sense that the theory would not be
able to predict a response to them.
In this section, we specify what we mean by such free
choices. The idea is that, for a given theory, the state-
ment that a parameter of the theory, say A, is considered
free is equivalent to saying that A is uncorrelated with
all values (described by the theory) that are outside the
6future of A. For this definition to make sense mathemat-
ically, we need to establish a notion of future. We do this
by introducing a causal order, i.e., a (partial) ordering of
events. We stress, however, that the causal order is only
used to define free choice and plays no further part in the
argument. 9
A. Causal order
Let Γ be the set of all parameters required for the de-
scription of an experiment within a given theory. In par-
ticular, Γ may contain variables that specify the (joint)
state in which the relevant physical systems have been
prepared (in the following usually denoted by Ψ for quan-
tum theory and by Z for more general theories), the
choice of measurements (denoted A and B), as well as
the measurement outcomes (denoted X and Y ). For any
such set of variables Γ, we can define a causal order  
as follows.
Definition 3. A causal order  for Γ is a preorder re-
lation10 on Γ.
If A X, we say that X is in the (causal) future of A,
and if this doesn’t hold, we write A 6 X. These relations
can be conveniently specified by a diagram (see Figure 3
for an example). Note that the causal order should not
be interpreted as specifying actual causal dependencies11,
but instead indicates that such causal dependencies are
not precluded (by the theory).
A typical—but for the following considerations not
necessary—requirement on a causal order is that it be
compatible with relativistic space time. Consider, for ex-
ample, an experiment where a parameter A is chosen at
a given space time point rA and where a measurement
outcome X is observed at another space time point rX .
One would then naturally demand that A  X if and
only if rX lies in the future light cone of rA. This cap-
tures the idea that the choice A is made at an earlier time
than the observation of X, with respect to any reference
frame.
B. Free random variables
To define the notion of a “free choice”, we consider a
set Γ of RVs equipped with a causal order. (As above,
Γ should be thought of as the set of all parameters rele-
vant for the description of an experiment within a given
theory.)
9 In particular, we do not assume local causality within the speci-
fied causal order.
10 That is,  is a binary relation on the set Γ that is reflexive (i.e.,
A A) and transitive (i.e., Z  A and A X imply Z  X).
11 I.e., A  X is not meant to imply that there is necessarily a
physical process such that changing A imposes a change of X.
E J
H
F
G
FIG. 3: Free choice and causal order. An arbitrary causal
order is depicted for random variables E, F , G, H and J . The
arrows correspond to the relation  . For example, G lies in the
future of F , i.e., F  G, but not of J , i.e., J 6 G. Because
of the transitivity property, it follows that F  E, for example.
In this setting we would say that, for instance, G is free if it is
uncorrelated with F and J , i.e., PGFJ = PG × PFJ .
Definition 4. We say that A ∈ Γ is free if
PAΓA = PA × PΓA
holds, where ΓA is the set of all RVs X ∈ Γ such that
A 6 X.12
Obviously, whether a variable from the set Γ is consid-
ered free depends on the causal order that we impose. If
the causal order is taken to be the one induced by rela-
tivistic space time (see the description above), then this
definition coincides with the notion of a free variable as
used by Bell [10].13 We remark that both standard quan-
tum theory and classical theory in relativistic space time
allow for free choices within such a causal order.
V. CONSTRAINTS ON THEORIES
COMPATIBLE WITH QUANTUM THEORY
We discuss here the implication of some well-known
results to our main question, whether an extension of
quantum theory can have improved predictive power.
Although they were not asking the same question, the
works of Bell [4] and Leggett [11] can be adapted to give
constraints on such higher theories, and hence give spe-
cial cases of the general theorem presented in Section VI,
which excludes all alternative theories whose predictions
are more informative than quantum theory.
A. Bipartite setup
The statements described below refer to a bipartite
setup which involves two separate measurements, speci-
12 By definition, the set ΓA also excludes A.
13 In [10], Bell discusses the assumption that the settings of instru-
ments are free variables, which he characterizes as follows: “For
me this means that the values of such variables have implications
only in their future light cones.”
7YX
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FIG. 4: The causal orders for which our argument applies.
We consider a setup with two separate measurements, one de-
pending on a choice A with outcome X, and the other with
choice B and outcome Y . Moreover, Z denotes all extra param-
eters that may be used to make predictions about the outcomes.
The figure illustrates all of the causal orders compatible with our
requirements (i)–(iii). The black arrows originating from A and
B are required, while each of the grey arrows originating from Z
is optional.
fied by parameters A and B, and with outcomes X and
Y , respectively. As before, we consider a theory that
allows us to compute predictions about these measure-
ments, based on a parameter (or list of parameters) Z.
Furthermore, in order to define free choices, we need to
specify a causal order. The technical claims described
in this section can be applied to any causal order that
satisfies the following conditions:
(i) A X and B  Y ;
(ii) A 6 Z and B 6 Z;
(iii) A 6 Y and B 6 X.
Condition (i) corresponds to the requirement that the
measurement is specified before its outcome is obtained.
Condition (ii) captures the fact that the parameters of
the theory, Z, on which the predictions are based, should
not only become available after the measurement process
is started. This assumption can be considered necessary
in order to reasonably talk about “predictions”. Finally,
Condition (iii) demands that the arrangement of the two
measurements should be such that neither of them lies
in the future of the other. (Note that, assuming a rela-
tivistic space time structure, this would correspond to a
setup where the measurements are space-like separated.)
Together, the three conditions imply a causal order in
which A is considered free if PABY Z = PA × PBY Z , and
likewise for B. The causal orders respecting (i)–(iii) are
illustrated in Figure 4.
B. Local deterministic theories
Local deterministic theories were introduced in the
work of Bell [4], and, within the bipartite setup described
above, are ones for which all conditional probabilities
PX|az(x) and PY |bz(y) are equal to either 0 or 1.
It follows using essentially the same argument used to
prove Bell’s theorem that no locally deterministic the-
ory can reproduce the predictions of quantum theory.
To show this, it is sufficient to consider the correlations
PNXY |ABψ2 that quantum theory predicts for the measure-
ments on the maximally entangled state |ψ2〉 defined in
Section II C. We state this as the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (No higher theories are locally determinis-
tic). Let A, B, X, Y and Z be RVs. Then at least one
of the following cannot hold:
• Freedom of choice:14 A and B are free with respect
to any of the causal orders depicted in Figure 4;
• Compatibility with quantum theory: PXY |ABZ is
compatible with the predictions PNXY |ABψ2 of quan-
tum theory (for some N ≥ 2);
• Local determinism:
PX|az(x) ∈ {0, 1} ∀ a, z s.t. PAZ(a, z) > 0
PY |bz(y) ∈ {0, 1} ∀ b, z s.t. PBZ(b, z) > 0 .
To prove this theorem, we use the correlation measure
IN defined in Section II C. The central idea is to show
that, under the free choice assumption, all correlations
explained by a locally deterministic model satisfy the in-
equality I2 ≥ 1, which corresponds to the CHSH inequal-
ity [9]. (The free choice assumption ensures that PAB|z
has full support for each z, and hence that the condi-
tional distributions PX|az and PY |bz are well defined for
any a, b, and z.) The assertion then follows from the fact
that IN (P
N
XY |ABψ2) = 2−
√
2 < 1 for N = 2 (see Eq. 1).
C. Stochastic local causal theories
In his later work, Bell dropped the assumption of de-
terminism and considered more general stochastic mod-
els. He adopted the following definition of locality called
local causality, which leads to the relation PXY |ABZ =
PX|AZPY |BZ [12]. Expanding the left hand side using
Bayes’ rule, this can be broken down into four sepa-
rate relations, PX|ABZ = PX|AZ , PY |ABZ = PY |BZ ,
PX|ABY Z = PX|ABZ and PY |ABXZ = PY |ABZ . The first
two of these have sometimes been termed parameter in-
dependence and imply that, even given access to Z, there
cannot be signalling between the two measurement pro-
cesses.
The last two conditions have been termed outcome in-
dependence. They do not have an obvious operational
14 The freedom of choice assumption is often not mentioned explic-
itly, but its necessity has been stressed by Bell in later work [10].
8significance (such as no-signalling), and do not in gen-
eral hold for the theories we consider in this work. We
note, however, that they are automatically satisfied in
any deterministic model, where each of the outcomes X
and Y is a function of A, B, and Z. Conversely, as we
argue below, if a theory is locally causal then the pre-
dictions it makes about the outcomes of measurements
on the entangled state |ψ2〉 = 1√2 (|↑↑〉 + |↓↓〉) are nec-
essarily deterministic. (This is the essence of the EPR
argument [1].)
To see this, note that for any projective measurement
(specified by A = a) applied to the first part of |ψ2〉,
there exists another projective measurement (specified
by B = ba) on the second part such that the outcomes
are perfectly correlated. For example, if A = a corre-
sponds to the POVM {|↑〉〈↑| , |↓〉〈↓|}, and if we choose
B = ba such that it corresponds to the same POVM, then
PXY |aba(0, 0) = PXY |aba(1, 1) =
1
2 . This means that X
is determined by Y , i.e., PX|abayz(x) = δx,y ∈ {0, 1} for
all a, x, y and z. Applying now the conditions of lo-
cal causality, we obtain PX|abyz(x) = PX|az(x) ∈ {0, 1},
which corresponds to the assumption of local determin-
ism. Hence, there is an analogue of Theorem 1 in which
the local determinism condition is weakened to Bell’s lo-
cal causality condition.
We remark that, as we shall see below (Lemma 1), the
freedom of choice assumption implies parameter indepen-
dence, but is not strong enough to imply local causality,
since it doesn’t imply outcome independence.
D. Leggett-type theories
In [11], Leggett introduced what he calls a “non-local
hidden variable” model, which attempts to give an expla-
nation of quantum correlations that is partly local and
partly non-local. The presence of non-local hidden vari-
ables in his model leads to an incompatibility with the
free choice assumption, and hence Leggett’s model is not
a higher theory in the sense of the present work. How-
ever, since the behaviour of the non-local variables is not
specified in Leggett’s model, we can consider a slightly
modified version in which they are ignored (henceforth,
when we speak about Leggett’s model, we refer to the
local part of it). The model is then compatible with
our notion of free choice, and offers improved predictive
power for measurements on maximally entangled parti-
cles. We note that the model is not a full-fledged theory,
as it only specifies how the outcomes of spin measure-
ments are obtained.
Leggett’s model is based on the idea of assigning to
each spin particle a three-dimensional vector (in addi-
tion to its quantum mechanical state). In particular, if
we consider two spin particles, each measured on one side
within the bipartite setup described above, we need to
specify two such vectors, denoted u and v, respectively.
To connect this to our general discussion, we may think
of these vectors as part of Z, i.e., Z takes as values pairs
(u,v). As above, we denote the choice of measurement
on each side by A and B. Restricting to projective spin
measurements, the two choices may be labelled by three-
dimensional vectors, denoted a and b, respectively, indi-
cating their orientation in space (see, for example, [13]
for more details). The predictions for the measurement
outcomes X and Y , as prescribed by Leggett’s model,
are then given by
PX|auv(x) =
1
2
(1 + (−1)xa · u) (3)
PY |buv(y) =
1
2
(1 + (−1)yb · v) . (4)
In order to completely define the model, one would also
need to assign probabilities to all possible values Z =
(u,v), i.e., specify a probability distribution PZ (which,
in general, depends on the quantum state). However, the
following theorem, which is a corollary of results in [11,
13–15], implies that there is no such assignment for which
Leggett’s model can be made compatible with quantum
theory.
Theorem 2 (No higher theories obey the Leggett condi-
tions). Let A, B, X, Y and Z be RVs. Then there exists
a quantum distribution, PXY |ABψ2 , such that at least one
of the following cannot hold:
• Freedom of choice: A and B are free with respect
to any of the causal orders depicted in Figure 4;
• Compatibility with quantum theory: PXY |ABZ is
compatible with PXY |ABψ2 ;
• Leggett rule: PXY |ABZ satisfies Eqs. 3 and 4 for
all values A = a, B = b, and Z = (u,v).
We will not give a proof of this theorem here, since
it follows from the more general results presented in
the next section. To see this, it is sufficient to ob-
serve that, when measuring the entangled state |ψ2〉 =
1√
2
(|↑↑〉+ |↓↓〉), for instance, quantum theory prescribes
that PX|a(x) = 12 , independently of the orientation a of
the measurement. Conversely, Leggett’s model predicts a
non-uniform distribution whenever the measurement ori-
entation a is not orthogonal to the vector u. The Leggett
model is therefore more informative than quantum the-
ory, and hence excluded by Lemma 3 (as well as the more
general Theorem 3) below.
E. Other Constraints
Here we summarize a few other known constraints on
theories compatible with quantum mechanics. One of the
first results in this direction was that the quantum out-
comes cannot be predetermined within a non-contextual
model [2, 3]. In such a model, one assumes the existence
of a map from the set of projectors to the set {0, 1} such
that for every set of projectors that constitute a POVM,
9only one member of that set is mapped to 1 (the element
that maps to 1 is interpreted as the outcome that will oc-
cur if a measurement described by that POVM is carried
out). Such a model is non-contextual in that whether
or not a particular outcome occurs depends only on the
individual projectors, and not on the set of projectors
making up the POVM. The Bell-Kochen-Specker theo-
rem [2, 3] implies that no such assignment can exist if
the Hilbert space dimension is at least 3.
Hardy [16] later showed that within any extended the-
ory, an infinite number of underlying states are required,
even to describe a single qubit, and Montina [17, 18]
proved, under the assumption of Markovian dynamics,
that the number of real parameters that an extended
theory needs to characterize a state in Hilbert space di-
mension N is at least 2N − 2 (the same as the number
of parameters needed to specify a pure quantum state up
to global phase).
In addition, a claim in the same spirit as our non-
extendibility theorem (presented in the next Section) has
been obtained recently [19] under the assumption of mea-
surement non-contextuality, introduced in [20].
VI. THE NON-EXTENDIBILITY THEOREM
This section is devoted to the key result of this pa-
per, asserting that quantum theory is maximally infor-
mative. Stated informally, we make the following claim,
first made in [5].
Claim 1. No alternative theory that is compatible with
quantum theory and allows for free choice (with respect
to the discussed causal orders) can give improved predic-
tions.
The main technical statement is a generalization of the
theorems discussed in the previous section. The setup is
broadly the same, but instead of the condition that the
higher theory remains compatible with quantum theory
for measurements on maximally entangled states, we re-
quire this for a wider class of states. Furthermore, rather
than considering theories that satisfy local determinism
or the Leggett rule, the claim is about arbitrary theories
that make improved predictions.
The main technical theorem is as follows (this should
be read as a purely mathematical statement about bipar-
tite pure states, whose significance to the extendibility of
quantum theory will be explained subsequently).
Theorem 3. Let |φ〉SD be a pure state and let {|yˆ〉D} be
a Schmidt basis on D. Then there exists a state |Γ〉S˜D˜
and local POVMs {Eax} and {F by} on SS˜ and DD˜, re-
spectively, with F b0y = |yˆ〉〈yˆ|D⊗1 D˜ for some b = b0, such
that, for any RVs A, B, X, Y and Z, at least one of the
following cannot hold:15
15 Strictly speaking, the entangled state and POVMs should be se-
• Freedom of choice: A and B are free with respect
to any of the causal orders depicted in Figure 4;
• Compatibility with quantum theory: PXY |ABZ
is compatible with the prediction PXY |AB(φ⊗Γ) of
quantum theory for the measurements {Eax} and
{F by} on |φ〉SD ⊗ |Γ〉S˜D˜.16
• Improved predictions: PY |b0φ is not as informative
as PY |b0Z .
To understand the implications of this theorem, con-
sider a fixed measurement aˆ on a system S. Assume
that, according to quantum theory, the system (before
the measurement) is in a pure state, denoted ψ, and that
the measurement corresponds to a projective POVM,
{Eˆaˆxˆ}. Quantum theory then gives a probabilistic pre-
diction PXˆ|aˆψ for the measurement outcome Xˆ, which
depends on ψ and {Eˆaˆxˆ} (see Eq. 2). Our aim is to com-
pare this quantum-mechanical prediction with the pre-
diction PXˆ|aˆZ that may be obtained by an alternative
theory, whose parameters we denote by Z.
In order to relate this to the theorem, let us assume
that the freedom of choice condition holds, from which it
follows that the alternative theory is no-signalling (i.e., it
would be impossible to signal in the higher theory, even
knowing the parameter Z). We then consider the joint
state of the measured system, S, and the measurement
device, D, after the measurement aˆ. Following the dis-
cussion in Section III, according to quantum theory, this
state can be assumed to have the form
|φ〉SD =
∑
xˆ
√
Eˆaˆxˆ |ψ〉S ⊗ |xˆ〉D . (5)
Note that the POVM {F b0y } defined by Theorem 3 corre-
sponds to a measurement of D in the basis {|xˆ〉D}. The
outcome, Y , of this measurement can therefore be seen
as a copy of the outcome Xˆ of the original measurement,
specified by {Eˆaˆxˆ}. In particular, the prediction that any
theory compatible with quantum theory makes about Y
must be identical to the prediction it makes about Xˆ,
i.e., we have
PXˆ|aˆψ = PY |b0φ
PXˆ|aˆZ = PY |b0Z .
(Note that because the free choice assumption implies
that the alternative theory is no-signalling, the prediction
the alternative theory makes about Y does not depend
on aˆ, for example.)
quences of entangled states and POVMs, for which the maximum
improvement in the prediction tends to 0 (c.f. Lemma 3).
16 Formally, PXY |AB(φ⊗Γ) is given by
PXY |ab(φ⊗Γ)(x, y) = tr((Eax ⊗ F yb ) |φ⊗ Γ〉〈φ⊗ Γ|) .
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We now apply Theorem 3 to |φ〉SD. If we assume that
the alternative theory, in addition to being compatible
with quantum theory, satisfies the freedom of choice as-
sumption, then the third condition of the theorem cannot
hold, i.e., PY |b0φ is as informative as PY |b0Z . Using the
above identities, this directly carries over to the original
measurement aˆ, i.e., the quantum-mechanical prediction
PXˆ|aˆψ is as informative as the prediction PXˆ|aˆZ of the
alternative theory. We hence establish Claim 1.
VII. PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The theorem follows from three statements, which we
formulate and prove separately. An overview of the argu-
ment is as follows. We consider the previously introduced
bipartite scenario and any of the causal orders depicted
in Figure 4. We begin by showing that free choice with
respect to this causal order implies that the alternative
theory is no-signalling (see Lemma 1). In the second part
of the argument, we show that for measurements on max-
imally entangled states, if quantum theory is correct, no
higher theory can give improved predictions about the
outcomes (see Lemma 3). In the final part of the ar-
gument, we generalize this to measurements on an arbi-
trary bipartite entangled state. More precisely, we show
that for any such state, there exist local measurements
that generate correlations arbitrarily close to those gen-
erated by r maximally entangled states for some suffi-
ciently large integer r. Hence, from the second part of
the argument, these measurements can have no improved
predictions.
A. Part I: No-signalling from free choice
In this part, we show that if A and B are free choices
with respect to one of the given causal orders, then there
is no signalling within the alternative theory (i.e. no sig-
nalling even given access to Z).17
Lemma 1. The freedom of choice assumption implies
PXZ|AB = PXZ|A and PY Z|AB = PY Z|B.
Proof. That A is free within the specified causal order
implies PA|BY Z = PA and hence
PY ZA|B = PY Z|B × PA|BY Z = PA × PY Z|B , and
PY ZA|B = PA|B × PY Z|AB = PA × PY Z|AB .
We therefore have PY Z|AB = PY Z|B . The relation
PXZ|AB = PXZ|A follows by symmetry.
17 As explained in Section III, the interpretation of this as “no-
signalling” may change if Z is thought of as in principle unlearn-
able. However, we stress that the same mathematical conditions
remain in that case too.
B. Part II: Non-extendibility for measurements on
maximally entangled states
In the second part of the argument, we show that the
claim holds for particular measurements on maximally
entangled pairs of qubits. The proof uses the correla-
tion measure IN introduced in Section II C. The following
lemma shows that this measure, applied to a distribution
PXY |AB , gives a bound on how well any additional infor-
mation, Z, can be correlated to the outcome X. Note
that the lemma is independent of quantum theory and is
simply a property of probability distributions.
Lemma 2. Let PXY Z|AB be a distribution that obeys
PXZ|AB = PXZ|A and PY Z|AB = PY Z|B. Then, for all a
and b, we have〈
D(PX|abz, PX¯)
〉
z
≤ 1
2
IN (PXY |AB) , (6)
where 〈·〉z denotes the average over the values of Z (dis-
tributed according to PZ|ab), and PX¯ denotes the uniform
distribution on X.
The proof is based on an argument given in [5], which
develops results of [21], [22] and [15].
Proof. We first consider the quantity IN evaluated for the
conditional distribution PXY |ABz = PXY |ABZ(·, ·|·, ·, z),
for any fixed z. The idea is to use this quantity to bound
the variational distance between the conditional distribu-
tion PX|az and its negation, 1−PX|az, which corresponds
to the distribution of X if its values are interchanged.
If this distance is small, it follows that the distribution
PX|az is roughly uniform. Because this holds for any
Z = z, X must be independent of Z.
It is first worth noting that the conditions of the
lemma (PXZ|AB = PXZ|A and PY Z|AB = PY Z|B) im-
ply PX|ABZ = PX|AZ and PY |ABZ = PY |BZ respectively,
and together imply PZ|AB = PZ .
Let PX¯ be the uniform distribution on X. For a0 := 0,
b0 := 2N − 1, we have
IN (PXY |ABz)
= P (X = Y |a0, b0, z) +
∑
a∈AN, b∈BN
|a−b|=1
P (X 6= Y |a, b, z)
≥ D(1− PX|a0b0z, PY |a0b0z) +
∑
a∈AN, b∈BN
|a−b|=1
D(PX|abz, PY |abz)
= D(1− PX|a0z, PY |b0z) +
∑
a∈AN, b∈BN
|a−b|=1
D(PX|az, PY |bz)
≥ D(1− PX|a0z, PX|a0z)
= 2D(PX|a0b0z, PX¯) . (7)
The first inequality follows from the fact that
D(PX|Ω, PY |Ω) ≤ P (X 6= Y |Ω) for any event Ω (see
Lemma 6 in Appendix A). Furthermore, we have used
the conditions PX|abz = PX|az and PY |abz = PY |bz, and
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the triangle inequality for D. By symmetry, this relation
holds for all a and b.
We now take the average over z on both sides of (7).
The left-hand-side gives∑
z
PZ|ab(z)IN (PXY |ABz)
=
∑
z
PZ(z)IN (PXY |ABz)
=
∑
z
PZ|a0b0(z)P (X = Y |a0, b0, z)+∑
a∈AN, b∈BN
|a−b|=1
∑
z
PZ|ab(z)P (X 6= Y |a, b, z)
= P (X = Y |a0, b0) +
∑
a∈AN, b∈BN
|a−b|=1
P (X 6= Y |a, b, c)
= IN (PXY |AB) , (8)
where we used the condition PZ|ab = PZ several times.
Furthermore, taking the average on the right-hand-side
of (7) yields∑
z
PZ|ab(z)D(PX|abz, PX¯) = D(PXZ|ab, PX¯ × PZ|ab) ,
which is equivalent to the left-hand side of (6).
We now apply Lemma 2 to the quantum correlations
PNXY |abψ2 arising from measurements on the maximally
entangled state ψ2 (c.f. Section II C). In the limit where
N tends to infinity, we have limN→∞ IN (PNXY |AB) = 0,
and hence we can establish that PX|abz = PNX|abψ2 for all
a, b and z with PNABZ|ψ2(a, b, z) > 0. Under the freedom
of choice assumption and assuming compatibility with
quantum theory (note that PNX|abψ2(x) = PX¯(x) =
1
2 for
both x = 0 and x = 1) this implies PX|az = PNX|aψ2 for
all a and z with PZ|a(z) > 0. This means that Z gives no
additional information about the measurement outcome,
X.
Taking Parts I and II together, we obtain the following
lemma, which may be of independent interest.
Lemma 3 (No higher theories give improved predictions
for pairs of maximally entangled qubits). For any δ > 0
there exists an N ∈ N such that for any RVs A, B, X,
Y and Z, at least one of the following three conditions
cannot hold:
• Freedom of choice: A and B are free with respect
to any of the causal orders depicted in Figure 4;
• Compatibility with quantum theory: PXY |ABZ is
compatible with PNXY |ABψ2 ;
18
18 Note that this condition is (by definition) only satisfied if PA
and PB have full support.
• Improved predictions: There exists a value A =
a such that 〈D(PX|az, PX|aψ2)〉z > δ, where 〈·〉z
denotes the expectation value over z.
Hence, if an alternative theory is compatible with
quantum theory and satisfies the freedom of choice as-
sumption then the third condition cannot hold, i.e.,
〈D(PX|az, PX|aψ2)〉z ≤ δ. Since δ can be arbitrarily
small, this implies that quantum theory is as informa-
tive as the alternative theory.
C. Part III: Generalization to arbitrary
measurements
The last part of the proof of Theorem 3 consists of
generalizing Lemma 3, which applies to specific measure-
ments on a maximally entangled state, to measurements
on the general state |φ〉SD. The proof relies on the con-
cept of embezzling states [23]. These are entangled states
that can be used to extract any desired maximally entan-
gled state locally and without communication. More pre-
cisely, we will use the following lemma, which is implicit
in [23].
Lemma 4. For any δ > 0 and for any k ∈ N there exists
a bipartite state
∣∣Γk〉
S˜D˜
, the embezzling state, such that
for any m ≤ k, there exist local isometries, Um and Vm,
on S˜ and D˜, respectively, that perform the transforma-
tion
Um ⊗ Vm :
∣∣Γk〉
S˜D˜
7→ ∣∣Γk〉
S˜D˜
⊗ |ψm〉S′D′
with fidelity at least 1 − δ, where |ψm〉S′D′ :=
1√
m
∑m−1
x=0 |xˆ〉S′ |xˆ〉D′ denotes a maximally entangled
state of two m dimensional systems.
Note that the state |φ〉SD considered in Theorem 3 can
be represented by its Schmidt decomposition as
|φ〉SD =
∑
yˆ
√
pyˆ |yˆ〉S ⊗ |yˆ〉D .
We now consider an embezzling state on S˜D˜ and use
Lemma 4 to define isometries Uˆ and Vˆ on SS˜ and DD˜,
respectively, which are controlled by the entry yˆ in the
registers S or D, and build up entanglement between
registers S′ and D′, i.e.,
Uˆ =
∑
yˆ
|yˆ〉〈yˆ|S ⊗ Um(yˆ)
Vˆ =
∑
yˆ
|yˆ〉〈yˆ|D ⊗ Vm(yˆ) .
The integersm(yˆ) are chosen such that the state resulting
from applying Uˆ⊗Vˆ to |φ〉SD ⊗
∣∣Γk〉
S˜D˜
is close to a state
of the form(
2−r/2
∑
yˆ
m(yˆ)−1∑
yˆ′=0
|yˆ, yˆ′〉SS′ ⊗ |yˆ, yˆ′〉DD′
)
⊗ ∣∣Γk〉
D˜S˜
,
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with
∑
yˆm(yˆ) = 2
r, for some integer r. (This can be
achieved to arbitrary precision for sufficiently large k
and m(yˆ).) Note that the first part of this state corre-
sponds to r maximally entangled pairs, |ψ2〉⊗r, between
the registers SS′ and DD′. 19 We now construct the
POVMs {Eax} and {F by} by concatenating the operations
Uˆ and Vˆ with the projective measurements along the
vectors
∣∣( ai2N + xi)pi〉 and ∣∣( bi2N + yi)pi〉 introduced in Sec-
tion II C. More precisely, we define
Eax := Uˆ
† ·
[( r⊗
i=1
∣∣( ai2N + xi)pi〉〈( ai2N + xi)pi∣∣)
DD′
⊗ 1 D˜
]
· Uˆ
F by := Vˆ
† ·
[( r⊗
i=1
∣∣( bi2N + yi)pi〉〈( bi2N + yi)pi∣∣)
SS′
⊗ 1 S˜
]
· Vˆ
with a = (a1, . . . , ar) ∈ A×rN and b = (b1, . . . , br) ∈ B×rN ,
for some large N . In addition we define
F b0y = |yˆ〉〈yˆ|S ⊗ 1 S˜ .
Assume now that the freedom of choice as well as the
compatibility with quantum theory assumption are sat-
isfied. Furthermore, let X = (Xˆ, Xˆ ′) and Y = Yˆ be
the outcomes of the measurements A = a0 := (0, . . . , 0)
and B = b0, respectively. By choosing the orientation of
the vectors |↑〉 and |↓〉 of Section II C appropriately, we
can arrange it so that quantum theory predicts that the
outcomes of the measurements of a0 and b0 are in agree-
ment, in the sense that Xˆ = Y holds with probability
1. Hence, together with the no-signalling conditions (c.f.
Lemma 1) we find that
PY |b0(ψ⊗Γ) = PXˆ|a0(ψ⊗Γ)
PY |b0Z = PXˆ|a0Z
Lemma 3 implies that, PX|a0(ψ⊗Γ) must be as informa-
tive as PX|a0Z . In particular, the same relation holds for
the marginals of these distributions, i.e, PXˆ|a0(ψ⊗Γ) is as
informative as PXˆ|a0Z . Combining this with the above
identities we find that PY |b0ψ = PY |b0(ψ⊗Γ) is as informa-
tive as PY |b0Z , thus concluding the proof of Theorem 3.
VIII. ALTERNATIVE THEORIES ARE
EQUIVALENT TO QUANTUM THEORY
In this section, we discuss an implication of the non-
extendibility theorem (Theorem 3) to a long-standing
19 As a simple example, consider the state |φ〉SD = 12
∣∣0ˆ〉
S
∣∣0ˆ〉
D
+√
3
2
∣∣1ˆ〉
S
∣∣1ˆ〉
D
. In this case we would take m(0) = 1 and
m(1) = 3 to yield a state of the form 1
2
(
∣∣0ˆ0ˆ〉
SS′
∣∣0ˆ0ˆ〉
DD′ +∣∣1ˆ0ˆ〉
SS′
∣∣1ˆ0ˆ〉
DD′ +
∣∣1ˆ1ˆ〉
SS′
∣∣1ˆ1ˆ〉
DD′ +
∣∣1ˆ2ˆ〉
SS′
∣∣1ˆ2ˆ〉
DD′ ) after the
transformation.
debate on the nature of the quantum mechanical wave
function. The debate centres around whether it should
be interpreted as a subjective quantity, for example a
state of knowledge about some underlying physical re-
ality, or whether it should instead be interpreted as ob-
jective (real).20 The wave function could be considered
subjective if there existed an alternative theory, with pre-
dictions based on a parameter Z, that is at least as in-
formative as quantum theory, and in which two different
wave functions, say ψ and ψ′, are compatible with the
same value of the parameter, say Z = z. Formally, this
would mean that there exist z, ψ, and ψ′ 6= ψ such that
PZΨ(z, ψ) > 0 and PZΨ(z, ψ
′) > 0. This is sometimes
called a ψ-epistemic view of the wave function and con-
trasts with the ψ-ontic, or objective, view [25] (we refer
to [24, 26, 27] for arguments in favour of the ψ-epistemic
view). In the latter, the wave function is uniquely deter-
mined by the parameters of any alternative theory that
is at least as informative as quantum theory, i.e., there
exists a (deterministic) function, f such that Ψ = f(Z).
Our result is based on the following simple lemma,
which asserts that, if an alternative theory is equally
informative as quantum theory then the wave function
is indeed uniquely determined by the parameter of the
alternative theory.
Lemma 5. Suppose {Eax} form a tomographically com-
plete set of POVMs, and A, X, Ψ and Z are RVs such
that:
• A is a free choice with respect to a causal order in
which A 6 Z and A 6 Ψ.
• PX|AZ is at least as informative as PX|AΨ, where
PX|aψ(x) = tr(Eaxψ).
• PX|AΨ is at least as informative as PX|AZ .
Then there exists a function, f , such that Ψ = f(Z).
Proof. If PX|AZ is at least as informative as PX|AΨ, then
there exists a distribution P¯XZΨ|A such that
PX|aψ =
∑
z
P¯XZ|aψ(·, z) ∀ a, ψ
PX|az =
∑
ψ
P¯XΨ|az(·, ψ) ∀ a, z.
(we drop the bar on P in the following, and simply use
PXZΨ|A to denote this distribution). We have
PX|azψ = PX|az
20 Note that in some subjective interpretations (e.g. [24]) there is no
underlying physical reality—the wave function is simply a state
of knowledge about future measurement outcomes and nothing
more.
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for all a, z, ψ that have a non-zero joint probability, i.e.,
PAZΨ(a, z, ψ) > 0. Likewise, if PX|AΨ is at least as in-
formative as PX|AZ then
PX|azψ = PX|aψ
holds under the same condition. Combining these ex-
pressions gives
PX|aψ = PX|az . (9)
If A is a free choice, we have PAZΨ = PA×PZΨ, hence (9)
holds provided that PZΨ(z, ψ) > 0 and PA(a) > 0.
Let now z, ψ and ψ′ be such that PZΨ(z, ψ) > 0 and
PZΨ(z, ψ
′) > 0. From (9), this implies PX|aψ = PX|aψ′
for all a such that PA(a) > 0. Since the set of measure-
ments with PA(a) > 0 is tomographically complete, this
can only be satisfied if ψ = ψ′. It hence follows that
there exists a function f such that Ψ = f(Z).
Combining Theorem 3 with Lemma 5, we can establish
the main result of this section, which we state informally
as follows.
Claim 2. [6] In any alternative theory that is at least as
informative as quantum theory and compatible with free
choice (with respect to the discussed causal orders), there
is a one-to-one correspondence between the parameters
of the alternative theory and the quantum state (up to a
possible removable degeneracy21 in the parameters of the
alternative theory).
To establish this, as before, we use Z to denote the
parameters of the higher theory. Theorem 3 shows that
under the freedom of choice assumption, quantum the-
ory is at least as informative as any alternative the-
ory. We hence satisfy the conditions of Lemma 5 so find
Ψ = f(Z), for some function f . Furthermore, since Z
cannot improve the predictions for any Ψ = ψ, any z in
f−1(ψ) must give identical predictions. Hence, if f−1(ψ)
contains more than one element, this corresponds to a re-
movable degeneracy in the parameters of the alternative
theory.
Related work
An interpretation of the wave function as a subjec-
tive state of knowledge about some underlying theory
has also been ruled out by Pusey et al. [28] via a differ-
ent argument using different assumptions which we now
summarize. They consider the preparation of multiple
quantum systems, with states Ψi, where each system is
21 Any degeneracy is removable in the sense that it has no oper-
ational effect, i.e., one can define another theory without the
degeneracy (but otherwise identical) without affecting the pre-
dictive power.
associated with a particular parameter in the higher the-
ory, Zi. Pusey et al. assume that the joint distribution
of these is product, i.e.
PZ1Z2...Ψ1Ψ2... = PZ1Ψ1 × PZ2Ψ2 × . . . . (10)
Starting from this assumption, they show that there can-
not exist two distinct states, ψ and ψ′, such that for each i
there exists a value of Zi = zi satisfying PZiΨi(zi, ψ) > 0
and PZiΨi(zi, ψ
′) > 0.
We note that the product nature of the joint distribu-
tion, Eq. (10), is related to free choice of preparation. In
particular, it implies
PΨ1Z2...ZNΨ2...ΨN = PΨ1 × PZ2...ZNΨ2...ΨN .
If we take the causal order to be such that Ψi 6 Ψj
and Ψi 6 Zj for j 6= i (as would be natural if we make
space-like separated preparations), then this is equivalent
to saying that Ψ1 can be chosen freely.
It was subsequently noted [29] that the separability
assumption can be weakened, in essence to the assump-
tion that there exists a particular set of parameters in
the higher theory that are compatible with every prod-
uct state composed of ψ and ψ′, i.e., there exist values of
the parameters, z1, . . . , zN , such that
PZ1...ZNΨ1...ΨN (z1, . . . , zN , ψ
(′), . . . , ψ(′)) > 0 ,
where each ψ(′) is independently either ψ or ψ′ (so that
the above represents 2N conditions). This condition can
be further weakened [30] such that the parameters of the
alternative theory for multiple systems need not be made
up only of the individual parts, but could be replaced or
supplemented with global parameters (provided these are
also compatible with all the product state preparations).
An alternative argument against an interpretation of
the quantum state as a state of knowledge about an un-
derlying reality can be found in [31].
We remark that some models in which the wave func-
tion is subjective have been developed for restricted sce-
narios. For example, by modifying an earlier model by
Bell [32], Lewis et al. constructed a model for a single
qubit in which the wave function is subjective, and ex-
tended that model to arbitrary dimensions [33]. These
models are not in conflict with Claim 2 because they treat
only single systems, and cannot be extended to bipartite
scenarios while allowing for free choice with respect to
one of the causal orders of Figure 4.
IX. DISCUSSION
The main statements described in this paper about
the completeness of quantum theory are based on two
assumptions. One of them is that quantum theory is cor-
rect, and is implicit in the question of completeness. The
other is that of free choice within a natural causal order.
It is worth commenting on the existence of alternative
models that are not compatible with this assumption.
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A prominent example is the de Broglie-Bohm
model [34, 35] which recreates quantum correlations, pro-
viding higher explanation in the form of hidden particle
positions. These can be thought of as parameters of a
higher theory that would allow perfect predictions of the
outcomes. However, introducing these parameters comes
at a price: it is incompatible with the freedom of choice
assumption of our theorems. In fact, for the bipartite set-
ting discussed above, if Z includes the particle positions
of the de Broglie-Bohm model, we have some non-local
behaviour, so that PX|abz = PX|az, for instance, does
not hold. Thus, given Lemma 1, it follows that A and B
cannot be free choices with respect to any of the causal
orders of Figure 4.
There are at least two ways to avoid our conclusions.
The first is to maintain free choice, but assume that the
alternative theory has a different causal order (in par-
ticular, one in which either A 6 Y or B 6 X does
not hold). The second is to consider alternative theories
without free choice, in which the measurement settings
A and B may depend on the additional parameters Z
(sometimes, this view is argued for by imagining that
the additional parameters are permanently hidden).
One may take the view that the freedom of choice
assumption, which demands complete independence be-
tween the chosen settings and the other variables, is rel-
atively strong, and perhaps contemplate alternative the-
ories where this assumption is weakened. Some results
in this direction can be found in [36], where a theorem
similar to Lemma 3 is established under a relaxed free
choice assumption, and provided there is no signalling at
the level of the underlying theory.
Finally, we note that the result presented here has
a generic application in quantum cryptography. Stan-
dard security proofs for schemes such as quantum key
distribution [37, 38] are based on the assumption (usu-
ally not stated explicitly) that quantum theory is com-
plete. If this were not the case, it could be that a scheme
is proven secure within quantum theory, yet an adver-
sary can break it by exploiting information available in a
higher theory. However, the non-extendibility theorem,
Theorem 3, implies that it is sufficient to make only the
weaker assumption that quantum theory is correct, since
this implies completeness.
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Appendix A: Variational Distance
The following is a list of the main properties of the
variational distance D(·, ·) used in this work:
• D(·, ·) is a metric on the space of probability dis-
tributions.
• D(·, ·) is upper bounded by 1.
• The variational distance of marginal distributions
cannot be larger than that of the joint distribu-
tions: D(PX , QX) ≤ D(PXY , QXY ) for any PXY
and QXY .
• It is convex: If {αi} satisfy αi ≥ 0 and∑
i αi = 1, and {P iX} and {QiX} are sets of dis-
tributions over X, then D(
∑
i αiP
i
X ,
∑
i αiQ
i
X) ≤∑
i αiD(P
i
X , Q
i
X).
• For a joint distribution PXY , the variational distri-
bution of the marginal distributions is bounded by
the probability that the RVs X and Y have differ-
ent values: D(PX , PY ) ≤ P (X 6= Y ).
The first four properties follow straightforwardly from
the definition. The last is proved in the following.
Lemma 6. Let X and Y be two random variables jointly
distributed according to PXY . Then the variational dis-
tance between the marginal distributions PX and PY is
bounded by
D(PX , PY ) ≤ P (X 6= Y ) .
Proof. Let P 6=XY := PXY |X 6=Y be the joint distribution
of X and Y conditioned on the event that they are not
equal. Similarly, define P=XY := PXY |X=Y . We then have
PXY = p 6=P
6=
XY + (1− p 6=)P=XY
where p6= := P (X 6= Y ). By linearity, the marginals of
these distributions satisfy the same relation, i.e.,
PX = p6=P
6=
X + (1− p6=)P=X
PY = p6=P
6=
Y + (1− p6=)P=Y .
Hence, by convexity of the variational distance,
D(PX , PY ) ≤ p 6=D(P 6=X , P 6=Y ) + (1− p 6=)D(P=X , P=Y )
≤ p 6= ,
where the last inequality follows because the variational
distance is at most 1, and D(P=X , P
=
Y ) = 0.
